The British invaded Mesopotamia (now called Iraq) in 1914 to protect their oil interests and they remained until 1958.
INTRODUCTION
In 1901 an Englishman, Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, obtained from H. R. H. the Shah a concession for working petroleum in all its forms in southern Persia. Mr. D'Arcy was "playing a lone hand." He was a courageous Englishman and he spent large sums of money in prospecting from one field to another, but without success. He exhausted his original capital and was then able to interest other capital in Burma and India as well as in England. In 1908, he discovered the long-sought-for area and tapped what proved to be an immense and practically inexhaustible oil-field. This field is in Arabistan, within the territories over which the Sheikh of Muhammerah exercises control.
There are actually three stories in this book all woven into one. The first is of the British invasion, and the post invasion period.
In 1914, the British invaded Mesopotamia to protect their oil interests in the region. What began as a limited military initiative resulted in over four decades of active political and military involvement in that country.
In a hastily executed operation, without a real plan or objective, the British invaded Mesopotamia with a wholly inadequate and ill-prepared force, composed primarily of troops from India. There was absolutely no consideration given to the adverse weather conditions, non-existent infrastructure, requirements of keeping troops on the move supplied, civil administration, and so on. Despite all these adversities, they managed to defeat the troops of the Ottoman Empire in a war that lasted four years. After victory over the Turks, no consideration was made for the "post-invasion" period, and while the British controlled the government for decades and had to fight an insurgency that lasted for many years, they presented themselves to the local population as liberators.
The second story of this book is how similar the situation was for the British following its invasion in 1914 and the U.S. after its 2003 invasion. As soon as the hostilities ceased, wide scale looting occurred, and neither the British nor U.S. leaders appreciated the deep divide between the religious sects, nor their willingness to resort to violence to resolve their differences. Both governments expected that once the yoke of oppression was lifted from their shoulders, the people of Iraq would focus on building a future, and not settling old scores. Both the British and the U.S. shared a vision of the three communities of Iraq working together as a single nation, but found a dysfunctional civil administration and little interest in comingling of cultures under one rule. Both governments accepted their roles as keepers of the peace, protecting the people; but the local population only saw occupiers which they fought with a bloody local insurgency. Both the British and the U.S. expected more assistance from their allies than they received, and sadly, both were completely unprepared for the enormous fnancial investment that had to be made and the terrible cost in human lives resulting from their invasions.
There were many lessons that could have been - and should have been - learned from the British experience prior to the U.S. led invasion in 2003. What's sad is that a brief study of history could have anticipated, and avoided, many of the problems that have occurred. Unfortunately, this is war, and the consequences of ignoring history isn't an academic exercise, but rather, a human tragedy.
The third story of this book is how readily available the information about the British experience in Mesopotamia was to anyone who chose to search for it. Most of the documents used in this book were readily available from the digital libraries of both the U.S. and British militaries, and that information was augmented by newspapers, magazines and books from that period. The book also includes some of the writings of Thomas Edward (T.E.) Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. He, more than anyone, understood the Arab culture and the problems of occupation, and offered many suggestions on how our nations and cultures could work and live together.
One would have hoped that the U.S. political and military leaders would have spent a few hours on the internet researching the history of invasions into that region before launching one of our own.
AUTHOR/EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
My primary function in the creation of this book has been more of an editor, blending of the information from many sources into one readable text, and less of an author. That portion which I can claim to have written has primarily been creating bridges between the works of others, making the military analyses of war more readable to a civilian population, and clarifying discrepancies between the available literature.
Most of the documents from the military were made available by the Combat Studies Institute and the major contributions to this work have been provided by: Matthew W. Williams, Department of Defense (THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ FROM 1914-1926: WHAT WISDOM CAN THE UNITED STATES. DRAW FROM ITS EXPERIENCE?); Lieutenant Colonel James D. Scudieri, United States Army (IRAQ, 2003-4 AND MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN ENDS AND MEANS); PETER J. LAMBERT, MAJOR, United States Air Force (THE FORGOTTEN AIRWAR: AIRPOWER IN THE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN); Robert D. Ramsey III (Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present); Bud Bishop, United States Navy (OPERATIONAL ART: AN ANALYSIS OF BRITAIN'S SOUTHWEST ASIA CAMPAIGN IN WORLD WAR I; and, a number of British Military websites reflecting on World War I. Other significant contributors include LETTERS FROM MESOPOTAMIA FROM CAPTAIN ROBERT PALMER, WHO WAS KILLED IN THE BATTLE OF UM EL HANNAH, JUNE 21, 1916, A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA by Lt. Col. R. Evans, M.C., P.S.C., and THE WAR IN THE CRADLE OF THE WORLD BY Eleanor Franklin Egan.
